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I CORPORATIONS IN CONFLICT OF LAWS AND THE ‘DELAWARE 
SYNDROME’
It is beyond dispute now that corporations have replaced states as the most important makers 
of  waves  in  the  world’s  economy.  It  is  also  firmly  established  that  with  the  increasing 
globalisation of that economy corporations operate in many cases far beyond the borders of 
the country that presided over their birth. A company which crosses frontiers to operate outside 
its original jurisdiction can bring problems of several different kinds in its wake. A court dealing 
with such a company may have to ascertain which law is, or should be, the law which regulates 
its affairs. The company may have internal disorders or may be experiencing difficulties in its 
external relationships. In seeking to grapple with these problems the jurisdictions of the world are 
broadly divided into two camps. There are those which look to the law of the place of the 
company’s incorporation to govern these matters, and those which look to the law of the place of 
the central administration of the company as being the correct law to be supreme in this field. 
Some jurisdictions take a variety of half-way positions in this debate. 
This leads us to the separate but related question of the recognition of a foreign company 
by a ‘host’ jurisdiction in which it has begun operations. This can proliferate into disputes over 
the meaning and extent of the concept of recognition and its manifold consequences. How far 
does  recognition  extend?  Does  it  mean  that  the  foreign  company  is  recognised  in  all 
circumstances as being fully regulated by its "own" law, perhaps even to the extent of giving such 
a company certain rights and privileges not accorded to companies formed in the recognising 
state, or only that visiting corporations are to be extended no better treatment than their domestic 
brethren?
One aspect  of  the  issue  of  recognition involves  the difficulties  which arise  when a 
company transfers its central administration, or elements of this to a jurisdiction other than that in 
which it was incorporated. Here the attitude of the "host" state is crucial, because it may refuse to 
accept that the persons operating the business on its territory are in fact a company. It may do this 
on the grounds that these persons have not complied with the domestic law which applies to 
companies  with  their  central  administration  in  that  state,  and  may  well  treat  them  as  an 
unincorporated association or just as a group of individuals. The state from which the company 
came can also have an interest, because it can regard it as essential that the company maintains its 
central  administration  and  control  -  its  siège  réel or  its  sitz -  in  the  place  where  it  was 
incorporated or where it is registered.
All of these problems can arise when it is a truly foreign corporation that is doing the 
moving around.  However, a whole new set of problems come to the fore when the corporation 
in question is not truly foreign, but is a manifestation of the will of persons who are linked 
firmly with one jurisdiction, but  who seek to take advantage of what  are perceived to be 
favourable factors of another jurisdiction by going through the process of incorporating their 
activities there in  the  form of a  corporation,  intent  only on operating in  their  own home 
jurisdiction.  These ‘pseudo-foreign’ corporations1 challenge the heart of the philosophy of 
recognition of corporations espoused by the ‘host’ state.  It will need to consider what factor or 
factors it takes into account to determine what makes a foreign corporation ‘foreign’.  If a state 
feels threatened by these ‘pseudo-foreign’ corporations, it  will  need to decide how best to 
respond to  this  threat.   Should some doctrine  of  fraud a  la  loi be invoked to  defeat  the 
manipulations  of  the  incorporators,  or  does  the  whole  system of  recognition  need  to  be 
designed to ensure that key policies of the host state are not prejudiced.
One might argue that all of these problems and more have already been solved in other 
jurisdictions which comprise a federation of states which have different company laws. The US 
experience is often cited as a potential model, with its reliance on the place of incorporation 
theory and other factors to facilitate the operation of companies incorporated in one state in every 
other state in the Union. However this system has made it possible for companies to cluster 
around the one state which they perceive to have the laxest or most favourable company laws, 
and then to operate from there in other states which have a more severe or onerous regime, which 
perhaps lays greater emphasis on protecting groups of interested parties other than those favoured 
by the incorporators of the company. This phenomenon, known as the Delaware syndrome after 
the state most favoured in the US for the incorporation of companies, has aroused very vehement 
criticism  in  other,  particularly  European  countries.2 Indeed,  it  is  precisely  to  prevent  this 
phenomenon that many European jurisdictions have emphasised the importance of the location of 
the central office and administration of the company in their recognition rules. It has in the past 
proved well nigh impossible to persuade such states of the attractions of the Delaware syndrome, 
and led to the failure of many schemes designed to facilitate recognition across frontiers. 
In order to investigate these matters, it is necessary to examine the two major theories 
which determine the law which regulates a foreign corporation’s affairs, and then to see how 
these have affected the recognition philosophy adopted by those jurisdictions. From this point 
it becomes possible to turn to the way in which jurisdictions have responded to the Delaware 
syndrome and  to  the  perceived  threat  from pseudo-foreign  corporations.   It  will  become 
apparent that while many civil law jurisdictions have adhered to the real seat theory in an 
effort to defeat the Delaware syndrome, some such jurisdictions have begun to change to the 
place of incorporation doctrine to seek other advantages.  The experience of the Netherlands 
and Switzerland is very instructive in this area, particularly because the Netherlands especially 
is experiencing problems with pseudo-foreign corporations at the present time.  The ways in 
which this jurisdiction and other place of incorporation jurisdictions have responded to the 
threat, may indicate that adherence to a real seat doctrine, with all of the disadvantages that 
this has for the mobility of corporations, is not the only way to counter threats to what are 
regarded as the essential interests of the citizens of a ‘host’ state.  Such a realisation could 
have a beneficial effect upon efforts to promote systems of mutual recognition of corporations 
and lead the way to more positive outcomes which can benefit world trade.
II. THE GOVERNING LAW THEORIES
A credo for the governing law was given by Rabel in the following terms,
"The essential incidents of the activities of any legal entity are controlled by one 
municipal law, a single ubiquitous personal law, parallel to the statute personal of 
1  See E.R.Latty, “Pseudo-Foreign Corporations” (1955) 65 Yale L.J. 137.
2  See Grossfeld,  Rabels Z., 1967, 1; Caflisch, Ann. Suisse de Dr.  Int.  1967; Grasman, System des 
Internationalen Gesellschaftesrechts 1970; Steiner and Vagts,  Transnational Legal Problems, 1968; Baade, 
Rabels Z. 1973, at p.34.
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individuals. .... This law governs existence, capacity, internal structure, external 
legal relations, modifications of the charter and dissolution of the legal entity."3
While most states would agree on the desirability of having these matters determined by a single 
municipal law, there is little agreement on the selection of the connecting factor which links a 
company to a particular legal system. This connecting factor is crucial in a number of other 
important  areas.  It  permeates  the  whole  issue  of  the  recognition  of  companies  from other 
jurisdictions, because it is first necessary to specify how the fact that a company does hail from 
another jurisdiction is to be determined. What factor does a state use to classify a company as 
“foreign”. It is also highly relevant when states consider regulating foreign corporations wanting 
to do business on their territory. The matter again rears its head when states feel the need to 
discriminate against “foreign” corporations for any purpose. 4
There are a number of concepts which have been used by conflicts of laws rules in 
different countries in the world as a connecting factor, but in today’s world there are really only 
two theories of any widespread practical significance.  These are the place of incorporation theory 
and the real seat theory.
A. The Place of Incorporation Theory
It is worth investigating the application of this theory first of all in jurisdictions where it has long 
played a characteristic role. Those which seem particularly apposite for this purpose are those of 
England and the United States. 5 One of the major advantages of the place of incorporation theory 
in practice is its certainty. It is a relatively simple matter to discover where a corporation has been 
incorporated,6 and upon proof that this incorporation was validly carried out, the court of the 
forum applying this conflicts rule can feel free to recognise the entity, in so far as recognition 
merely acknowledges the attribution of corporate personality. In respect of England, the authors 
of  Dicey  and  Morris  express  this  view in  Rule  155,  which  holds  that,  “The  existence  or 
dissolution of a foreign corporation duly created or dissolved under the law of a foreign country 
is recognised in England.”7 Thus if a corporation is duly created under the law in force in its place 
of incorporation it is recognised as a corporation in England, and can sue and be sued in its 
corporate capacity. The place of incorporation theory goes further than this, and in providing 
rules for dealing with the consequences of recognition permits a court applying this conflicts rule 
to determine many of the attributes of the corporation by this law.  This aspect of the theory and 
3 Ernst Rabel, The Conflict of Laws A Comparative Study, 2nd. ed. 1960, Vol II p.3
4  Consider the criteria used initially by the British Government when it wanted to protect its nationals 
from “quota hopping” by Spanish owned British registered fishing vessels. It redefined eligibility to register as 
a British fishing vessel in the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 in terms of the vessel needing to be British owned, 
a concept which referred to the legal and beneficial ownership of vessels being vested in “qualified persons or 
companies”. Qualified companies for this purpose were defined as those which were incorporated in the 
United Kingdom, had their principal place of business there, had a defined percentage of their shares legally 
and beneficially owned by “qualified persons” and had such “qualified persons” as a defined percentage of its 
directors. “Qualified persons” were in turn defined as British citizens resident and domiciled in the United 
Kingdom. This legislation used quite a number of  connecting factors in a cumulative way, but was held to fall 
foul of Articles 52  and 221 of the Treaty of Rome in the Factortame decision. See Factortame Ltd and others 
v. Secretary of State for Transport (No. 2)  (Case C-213/89) [1991] 1 All E.R. 70.
5  It is interesting to note that Swiss law has recently adopted the place designated in the articles or 
contract of association as the test for determining the seat, and hence the domicile, of a company in its private 
international law (see below).
6  This may not always be such an easy matter where, for example, two states lay claim to the same 
territory, or where there are both de facto and de jure authorities competing for international recognition. For 
an explanation of the way in which some of these problems are resolved under UK law see the Foreign 
Corporations Act 1991 and the comments in Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 12th ed. 1993 ed. L. 
Collins, at pp. 1109-1110.
7  Op. cit., at p. 1107.
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some of the problems in its application are exemplified by Dicey and Morris’ Rule 156 which 
states, 
“(1) The capacity of a corporation to enter into any legal transaction is governed 
both by the constitution of the corporation and by the law of the country 
which governs the transaction in question.
 (2) All matters concerning the constitution of the corporation are governed by 
the law of the place of incorporation.”8
Thus, although the place of incorporation can determine many things, it is not always appropriate 
to determine all  things by reference to it.  The capacity of a company is limited by the law 
regulating the constitution of the corporation because this law must govern the overall limits on 
the capacity of the legal entity which is its creation. It can also be further limited by the law 
governing the transaction in question. Dicey and Morris gives an example to the effect that a 
corporation could not invoke a capacity to hold land given by the law of its place of incorporation 
in the teeth of the law applicable at the situs of the land which declared that land may not be held 
by a corporation.9 It is necessary to remember in this context that common law systems often 
regard capacity not as a separate issue, but as something regulated, for example, by the law of 
contract. Civil law systems on the other hand tend to regulate capacity as part of the general law 
dealing with persons and their status, and hence refer to concepts such as nationality to determine 
contractual capacity. 
English conflicts law, in so far as it has considered the issue, also seems to refer matters 
relating to the internal management of a corporation to the law of its place of incorporation. 
Hence matters such as the identity of the corporation’s officers authorised to act on its behalf, or 
the extent of a member’s liability for the corporation’s debts, have been referred to this law in 
English judgements.10 However, it should be noted that, as has been mentioned earlier, under the 
1968 Brussels  Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement  of Judgements in Civil  and 
Commercial Matters and the Lugano Convention, jurisdiction over many company law matters is 
vested in the courts of the country in which a company has its seat. As this may not always be in 
the  country  where  the  corporation  was  incorporated,  English  courts  may  have  further 
opportunities to think about this area of conflicts law.
In the United States, a corporation is generally recognised as being governed in many 
things by the law of its  domicile.  This concept  refers  to  the law prevailing at  the place of 
incorporation of the corporation.11  However, it may be necessary to separate out acts that can be 
performed by both individuals and by corporations, such as making contracts, committing torts 
etc. Another way of putting this might be to refer to conduct by the corporation which affects 
third persons. Here the general choice of law rules will apply regardless of whether the actor is or 
is not a corporation.12 Hence a corporation’s capacity to bind itself by contract will, as in the case 
of an individual, be determined by the law which governs that particular contract.13 Reese and 
Kaufman take the view that US cases , “hold that a corporation may receive, hold and dispose of 
land if it is permitted to do so by the law of the situs, even though it is denied such power by the 
8  Ibid., at p. 1111.
9  Ibid., at p. 1112.
10  See the cases cited ibid., at p. 1113.
11  For example, in the case of Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard 240 N.Y. 149, 147 N.E. 703 (1925) 
the Court of Appeals stated, “If the existence of the [foreign] corporation, its capacity to sue, or the authority of 
its directors to represent it or to bring the action is challenged, we look to the charter and the law of its 
corporate domicile for the data upon which we may rest our determination of such questions.”
12  The Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, § 301 (1971) provides: “The rights and liabilities of a 
corporation with respect to a third person that arise from a corporate act of a sort that can likewise be done by 
an individual are determined by the same choice-of-law principles as are applicable to non-corporate parties.”.
13  W. Rees and E. Kaufman “The Law governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and Full Faith and 
Credit”, (1958) 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1118, 1121.
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state of incorporation...”14 This indicates an interesting difference from the English position which 
would regard the two limitations on such capacity as acting cumulatively.  
In matters that are peculiar to corporations, regarding especially their “internal affairs”, 
reason and corporate efficiency would seem to demand reference to a single law.15 Here Reese 
and Kaufman state that these matters, “have been consistently held to be governed by the law of 
the state of incorporation in the absence of a local statute to the contrary”.16 This applies to 
foreign corporations from outside the US as well as to corporations formed in another state in the 
Union.17 However, American courts have had their own problems with the “Delaware Syndrome”, 
and have had to take steps to counter it. There may be separate rules which apply in the case of 
so-called “tramp” or “pseudo-foreign” corporations which are incorporated in one state (usually 
Delaware) but conduct all or nearly all of their business and activities in another. The case of 
Western Airlines Inc. v. Sobieski 18 exemplifies both the point and the response. Western Airlines 
was a company, incorporated in Delaware, which took over the shares of a California corporation 
by way of a share exchange. The corporation did more business in California than in any other 
state, and apparently did none in Delaware. It wished to amend its articles of incorporation to 
dispense with cumulative voting provisions, a matter which was possible under Delaware law. 
However, under California’s Blue Sky law a permit was required from the State Corporations 
Commissioner. The Californian court held that this law should be enforced, at least for the benefit 
of the California stockholders. Leflar comments on the case that, “The virtue of having internal 
corporate affairs regulated solely by some single law, for the sake of unity of operation, is evident, 
but it is hard to see why Delaware should have any better claim to dominance, on facts such as 
these, than California.”19 In cases other than those of pseudo-foreign corporations, where the 
company in question does business and carries out activities in several different states, local state 
statutes may provide that certain activities are to be governed by this local law rather than that of 
the state of incorporation. In such cases the question can be posed as to whether the ‘full faith and 
credit’  clause  of  the  US  constitution  requires  the  application  of  the  law  of  the  state  of 
incorporation rather than that of the local statute. The matter has not been definitively settled by 
the courts in the US. Reese and Kaufman express the following opinion, 
It is hazarded, however, that the law of the state of incorporation need not be 
applied in these situations where application of a single law is not essential, as, 
for  example,  where  the  question  affects  only  a  few,  rather  than  all,  of  the 
shareholders.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  thought  that  the  law of  the  state  of 
incorporation must be applied when it is important that the matters at hand be 
governed  by  a  single  law and  the  interest  of  other  states  are  not  seriously 
affected.20
These jurisdictions then favour a liberal policy on the issue of recognition, but in the US, 
where necessary, steps will be taken to prevent this liberal policy working to the disadvantage of 
14  Op. cit., at p. 1122.
15  The Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, § 302 (1971) provides:- “(1) Issues involving the rights 
and liabilities of a corporation, other than those dealt with in § 301, are determined by the local law of the state 
which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the 
parties ...(2) The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine such issues, except in the 
unusual case where, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to 
the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.”
16  Op. cit. at p. 1125
17  See for example the case of  Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696, 93 A.L.R. 2d 1340 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 369 (US) 885 (1962) concerning a Venezuelan corporation. 
18  Western Airlines Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).  See also Weede v.  
Bechtel, 239 Iowa 1298, 31 N.W. 2d 853, 8 A.L.R. 2d 1162 cert. denied  337 U.S. 918 (1948) 
19  R.  Leflar,  American  Conflicts  Law 3rd  ed.  1977  at  p.512,  see  also  Latty,  “Pseudo  Foreign 
Corporations” and the case of Mansfield Hardwood Lbr. Co. v. Johnson 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
361 U.S. 885, 926 (1959).
20  Op. cit., at p. 1144.
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interests within the forum state which it deems necessary to protect. Generally though, reference 
to the law of the place of incorporation of the corporation will determine the governing law for 
the internal affairs of the corporation.
It is also instructive to look at a jurisdiction that has considered the relative merits of the 
place of incorporation and real seat theories, and changed its rules in consequence.  Switzerland 
used to use the criterion of the real seat of a company as its connecting factor. Before the new 
private international law statute came into effect in 1989, in situations where the statutory seat of 
a company was different from its administrative seat, and it appeared to a Swiss court that the 
reason for this dichotomy was to evade certain provisions of the law of the country of the real or 
administrative seat, there was a tendency to declare the statutory seat (or registered office) a 
“fiction”,  and in  consequence  the  law applicable  at  the administrative office  was applied.21 
However, the new law, the  Bundesgesetz über das Internationale Privatrecht of 18 December 
1987 now provides in article 21 as follows:-
1. Companies are domiciled at their seat.
2. The seat of a company is at  the place designated in the articles or the 
contract of association. If there is no such designation, the seat is at the 
place where the company is in fact administered.22
This represents a considerable change in Swiss law. As Vischer has said, “The law allows the 
founders the possibility of choosing a place of incorporation ... irrespective of the motives for so 
doing. The fact that this choice is driven by a desire to circumvent (the application of certain 
laws) is not sufficient reason for Swiss law to call the choice into question. However, that is not to 
say that this circumvention of laws by the company incorporated abroad will not lead to some 
corrective order.”23
As Swiss law now basically adopts the place designated in the company’s articles or the 
contract of association as the law determining a company’s domicile, it can be seen as a place of 
incorporation country.24 The law of the domicile, or specifically the law of the country according 
to  which  the  company is  organised,  is  the  generally  applicable  law,  and  hence  covers  the 
recognition of the company, and its status, formation, capacity to have rights, internal relations (in 
particular  between  the  company  and  its  members),  liability  and  the  authority  of  its 
representatives.25  However, although a foreign company may well have to be recognised on the 
ground that it is properly incorporated according to the law of its domicile, it has been asserted 
that Swiss law retains the ability to take action where a company chooses a particular law of 
incorporation for dubious motives. Vischer has stated the opinion that, 
“although a company incorporated abroad must  a priori be recognised, there 
might  be  “ordre  public”  grounds  for  not  giving  effect  to  some  of  the 
consequences which flow from this.  For instance,  if  the foreign law were to 
crassly ignore the rights of the minority shareholder and allow the expropriation 
of his property in the company this would not be enforced by a Swiss court.”26 
However, in a case in 199127 the Swiss Bundesgericht recognised a Panamanian company whose 
shares were held by a Stiftung in Liechtenstein on behalf of a Lebanese individual. It overruled 
the  lower  Geneva  court’s  decision  based  on  fraud a  la  loi,  stating  that  the  Swiss  Private 
21  The author is indebted to Mark Farrell, a lawyer working with the legal department of ABB, for this 
information on Swiss law.
22  This translation of the Swiss text is  taken from, P. Karrer  and K.  Arnold,  Switzerland’s  Private 
International Law Statute of December 18 1987.
23  Vischer III Der fraus legis - Vorbehalt unter der Herrschaft des IPRG p. 1346 - translation by Mark 
Farrell see n.21 above.
24  See art 21 of the Swiss Private International Law Statute of December 18 1987 set out above.
25  Swiss Private International Law Statute Arts. 154 and 155.
26  Vischer III - op. cit. p. 1346 translation by Mark Farrell see n. 21 above.
27  Bundesgericht, 17 December 1991, BGE, II, 7, 494 et seq.
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International Law Statute of 1989 does not contain a  fraus legis exemption clause.28 It  thus 
appears that validity in the place of incorporation or under the law of the country according to 
which  the  company  is  organised,  is  the  sole  factor  to  be  taken  into  account  in  terms  of 
recognition. Protection against the consequences of abuse now has to be sought through other 
means (see below).
B. The Real Seat Theory.
In France and some other civil law countries the concept of nationality is apparently the major 
one used to link a company to a particular jurisdiction. This is discussed both in terms of the State 
regulating the collective activity  that is carried on within its territory, and in terms of diplomatic 
protection of its ‘nationals’ including companies. There is the idea that there should be a link of 
allegiance  between  the  State,  and  the  groups,  such  as  companies,  which  concentrate  their 
collective activity within its borders. However, the concept of nationality in fact uses the idea of 
the real seat of the company as its determining criterion. Authors agree that a company must 
necessarily be subjected to the law of one specific country, the law of which will regulate the 
relations of the company, through its organs, with the outside world, and will equally regulate the 
relations of the members and organs of the company internally under its constitution. It is felt that 
this law should be the one which reflects a real attachment of the company to a territory. After 
favouring initially  the place of the company’s  siège d’exploitation,  theoretical  and practical 
difficulties led the courts to prefer the law of the company’s seat. By this is meant the place where 
the directors meet, where the general meeting assembles and where the company’s administrative 
centre is located. This is the solution adopted for purely domestic application by French law. 
Article  3  of  law no.  66-537  of  24  July  1966,  the  principal  piece of  legislation  on French 
companies, states, “Companies whose seat is situated in French territory are subject to French 
law.” (author’s translation) The same concept is used in French conflict of laws to determine the 
law governing a foreign company. One justification used by Loussouarn and Bourel29 is that a 
company  which  has  its  managing  organs  in  France  can  be  presumed  to  have  French 
preoccupations and to revolve around French interests. Hence French law is the most appropriate 
one to govern its affairs. 
However, it is considered necessary by many jurisdictions that this must be the real seat of 
the enterprise, and that it is not just conducting its business through what is effectively a post box 
in  another  country.  Therefore  many  continental  European  jurisdictions  including  Germany 
(although some authors favour the registered office), Austria, Belgium, Portugal and Greece reject 
the idea of using the statutory or registered office as the determining criterion of the seat, and 
require that it represents the real centre of direction of the enterprise. This is the thinking which 
lies behind the continuation of Art. 3 of the law of 1966 regulating French companies referred to 
above, which reads, “Third parties can rely on the statutory seat (registered office), but this cannot 
be relied on by the company against them if its real seat is situated in another place” (author’s 
translation).  The disapproval  of  an attempt  to  have a  seat  in  a  place other than where the 
company’s direction in actuality takes place can be seen as a use of the concept of fraude à la loi. 
However,  this  doctrine  does  give  rise  to  certain  practical  problems,  especially  where  the 
company’s direction and administration is carried on in more than one country. According to 
Batiffol and Lagard30, “Le siège social est là où se trouvent “la direction supérieure et le contrôle  
de la société”, “et non celui où elle a seulement son exploitation et une direction de caractère  
28  See Chapter by S. Rammeloo in J.Wouters and H.Schneider (eds.),  Current Issues of Cross-Border 
Establishment of Companies in the European Union (1995, Antwerp), at p.65.
29  Y Loussouarn and P. Bourel, Droit International Privé (1993 Paris) at p. 657.
30  H. Batiffol and P. Lagard, Droit International Privé 7th ed. (Paris 1981-3) Vol II at p. 232.
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secondaire””.31 They say that normally there is but one place where final decisions are taken, and 
these are precisely those matters which should be determinative of the link. The matter is dealt 
with in French courts as a matter of fact for the judge to decide. Where there is a difference 
between the location of the meetings of the board of directors and that of the general meetings, 
Batiffol and Lagarde take the former as being more influential.32 Loussouarn and Bourel take the 
same line, but do add that where a business does have contact with several jurisdictions, a priori 
the company’s constitution can provide for the real operation of the direction of the company in 
one or in another of these countries. For Germany, Wulf-Henning Roth states that the, “Supreme 
Court (Bundesgerichthof) has defined the real seat of a company as the place where the internal 
management  decisions  of  a  company  are  transformed  into  the  day-to-day  activities  of  a 
company.”33 He refers to problems caused by the multi-state activities of certain companies, and 
says that if difficulties in determining the real seat do arise, German courts could be expected to 
equate the real seat with the seat specified in the company’s constitution.
31  Ibid., citing Req. 28 Oct. 1941, G.P. 1942.1.18; and Req. 22 Dec. 1941, S. 1942.1.31. They also cite 
Greek decisions to the same effect.
32  Op. cit., at p.233 n.5.
33  Wulf-Henning  Roth  in  his  contribution  to Current  Issues  of  Cross-Border  Establishment  of 
Companies in the European Union at p. 32, referring to the decision reported at BGH, 21 March 1986, 
BGHZ, 97, 269, 272.
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III THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
In this section we need to examine the bases adopted in various countries for the recognition of a 
foreign  corporation.  The  nature  of  the  consequences  or  effects  of  this  recognition  will  be 
examined under the two principal theories mentioned above and the two conflicting philosophies 
which underlie them will be considered.
A. The Basis for Recognition
There has been a debate about whether states ought to recognise foreign corporations at all. In 
both Europe and the US, in the last century, views were put forward to the effect that a company, 
being a creature of the legal system which created it, can have no existence outside the ambit of 
that law.34 These views , in part based upon the concession theory of corporate personality, have 
long been refuted. They have been replaced by what Rabel describes as the International Theory 
based  upon  the  idea  that  corporations  are  analogous  to  individuals,35 and  if  created  by  a 
competent state they need no particular recognition in other states. The imperatives of increasing 
capitalism and the demands of international commerce have led the way towards a more open 
attitude to the recognition of foreign corporations. Rabel states that recognition, “signifies that the 
authorities of a state affirm a foreign created legal person as existent for all purposes, applying the 
law considered to be the personal law.”36 Today corporations are generally recognised upon two 
distinct bases. Some countries use the concept of the real seat to determine the suitability of the 
foreign corporation for recognition. If the corporation is validly established according to the law 
of its real seat, then, subject sometimes to certain conditions, it will be recognised. The other 
school of thought, beginning perhaps in the common law world, uses the concept of the place of 
incorporation.  If  a  company  is  validly  formed  in  accordance  with  the  law of  its  place  of 
incorporation,  then  it  will  be  recognised.  In  this  area  though,  France has  followed its  own 
particular path, dictated in this instance perhaps more by accidents of history than a respect for 
any particular theory.
B. The Real Seat Approach
Countries like Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece and Germany use the concept of the real seat of the 
company to determine the link between the company and its system of law. What seems to be 
required is that in order to be recognised, there must be an appropriate link between the company 
and the  country from which  it  comes.  This  link will  usually  be the same as  that  which is 
ultimately used to determine the governing law. Hence, while nationality may be the apparent 
criterion for determining the governing law in some countries, its actual basis, that of the real 
seat, is the determining factor in terms of recognition. Therefore a company will be recognised in 
these countries if it is validly incorporated under the law of its real seat.
One matter which is slightly surprising is that many of the texts or authorities usually 
cited in respect of the recognition of foreign corporations are rather unclear on the matter. In 
Greek law for example, art 10 of the Civil Code states that, “The capacity of the legal entity is 
34  See for example the views of Laurent in  Droit Civil International  IV n.100, 119; Weiss,  Traité 
Théoretique et Practique de Droit International Privé,  Vol II p.448, and vol IV p.695, Judge Taney in Bank 
of Augusta v. Earle (1839) 13 Pet. S. C. 519 at 588, and Field J. in Paul v. Virginia (1868) 8 Wall. 168. See 
generally Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study at pp. 124-128.
35  See  for  example  the  views on the  ‘real  will’ and the  ‘real’ existence  of  corporations  and  other 
associations put forward by Otto Gierke in  Die Genossenschaftstheorie und die Deutche Rechtsprechung 
(1887) 5, 604.
36  Rabel op. cit., at p.132.
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regulated by the law of its seat”.37 This is enough for legal commentators to hold to the real seat 
recognition theory. Italian law is scarcely more helpful. Article 16 of the General Principles of 
Law preceding the Civil Code states that, “Aliens enjoy the civil rights attributed to citizens on 
condition of reciprocity and subject to the provisions contained in special statutes. This provision 
also applies to alien legal persons.”38  This is subject to article 31 of the General Principles, which 
says that, “Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding articles, in no case can the laws and 
acts of a foreign state ..... be effective within the territory of the State, when they are contrary to 
public policy or morals.”39 On this apparently slender basis, it is possible for a commentator to 
say that, “Foreign corporations and other entities are recognised in Italy on a reciprocal basis if 
they are recognised in the country of their incorporation, provided the foreign law is not contrary 
to Italian public order or public morals.”40 It is different however, if the foreign corporation has its 
head office or principal place of business in Italy, for then they are as subject to Italian law as if 
they were incorporated in Italy (Art. 2505 Civil Code). Hence we must say that Italy has adopted 
a compromise position because, while the place of incorporation has an important part to play, the 
real seat of the company is taken into account in determining the law applicable to the company 
and thus also in the context of recognition. However the notion of reciprocity does pose potential 
problems.
In Germany, the question of whether a legal entity is regarded under German Private 
International Law as being a properly incorporated legal entity is determined in accordance with 
the Sitztheorie, a test that uses the criterion of the actual and effective place of administration of 
the company.41 This theory is used because it is said to lead to the law of the state which is most 
affected by the activities of the company, and by giving effective control to that state, most 
effectively protects the interests of potential creditors.42 The theory was applied in one recent case 
with interesting results. The case43 concerned a company formed under the law of Gibraltar as a 
non-resident limited company. Its business was conducted by its major shareholder from his 
office in Germany. The court held that when a company which was incorporated abroad has its 
place of administration in Germany, the legal nature of the entity had to be determined pursuant 
to German law, regardless of whether the company had got legal personality according to the law 
of the country where it was formed. To be recognised as a legal entity it would have to comply 
with certain mandatory legal requirements enacted to protect third parties doing business with a 
company of this kind. This company was not entered on the commercial register at its  Sitz or 
place of administration (Germany), and so the court declined to recognise it as a legal entity. 
Instead it treated the transactions in question as if they had been carried out in the name of a 
company before its registration, and hence made the person who acted in its name personally 
liable for the contract that he had entered into under art 11(2) GmbHG 1980 (Law on private 
companies). He had acted on behalf of an entity which did not have legal personality according to 
German law, which under German conflict rules was the applicable law.
C. The Place of Incorporation Approach
37  In their “Explanation of the Civil code”, Georgiades and Stathopoulos, commenting on art. 10, state, 
“The formation of the legal entity is to be regulated by the law of its seat (Athens Court of Appeal 2701/1968). 
Even if the type of company is unknown to Hellenic law, this does not affect the acknowledgement of the legal 
personality within Hellas.” [Translation by Grace Katsoulis]
38  M. Beltramo, G. Longo and J Merryman,  The Italian Civil Code, (1969 Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.).
39  Ibid.
40  Maisto & Miscali,  Business Law Guide to Italy (1992 Wiesbaden) § 404 at p.35.
41  See BGH, NJW, 1986, 2194, 2195; OLG München, NJW 1986, 2197, 2198; OLG Hamburg, NJW 
1986, 2199; OLG Oldenburg, NJW 1990, 1422.
42  See the decision of the Bayerisches Oberstes Landgericht, (BayObLG, 7 May 1992, ZIP, 1992, 842), 
cited  by  Wulf-Henning  Roth  in  his  contribution  to Current  Issues  of  Cross-Border  Establishment  of  
Companies in the European Union, at p.31.
43  LG Marburg, RIW, 1994, 63.
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In common law countries the liberal tradition of recognition of foreign corporations goes back a 
long way. One of the leading cases in England is Henriques v Dutch West India Co.44, reported in 
1728, which founded the rule that a “corporation duly created in a foreign country is to be 
recognised as a corporation in England.”45 Whether an entity is a corporation depends on the law 
of the country in which it is formed.46 This same approach to recognition is taken, for example, in 
Ireland and Denmark. In these three countries the place of incorporation is the key factor linking 
a company to a system of law. It follows therefore that if a company has been properly formed in 
accordance with the law of its place of incorporation, then it will be recognised in these countries 
even if its real seat happens to be in another country, perhaps in one which adopts the real seat 
theory as its basis for linking a company to a system of law. For these place of incorporation 
jurisdictions the real seat will become a relevant factor where the company was incorporated in a 
country such as Germany where it is necessary for the real seat actually to be in Germany in order 
for the company to be properly constituted. If the central administration of such a company was, 
for example, in Belgium, the German authorities would not recognise the entity as being properly 
constituted, and hence English, Irish and Danish courts would tend not to recognise the company 
either. It is felt that they would take this view notwithstanding the fact that the Belgian authorities 
could adopt the position that the company was a valid legal entity, particularly if it had registered 
itself on the Belgian commercial  register. These courts would look at  the way in which the 
company was treated by the law of the place if its incorporation.
The Netherlands used to apply the theory of the siège réel but abandoned it by a law of 25 
July 1959, which provided that the recognition of a foreign company could not be refused simply 
because  its  siège  réel was  not  in  the  country  where  it  was  incorporated,  but  was  in  the 
Netherlands or in another country which took account of the company’s seat. Before 1959, Dutch 
law had an ambivalent attitude towards recognition  and governing law principles, with case law 
and  academic  writings  showing  adherence  to  both  the  real  seat  and  place  of  incorporation 
doctrines.47 Some of this hesitancy is reflected in the negative formulation of the Dutch rule, 
which  merely  rejects  the  siège  réel approach  but  does  not  explicitly  adopt  the  place  of 
incorporation theory. However Rammeloo states that, “since the turning point in 1959, case law 
has looked favourably upon the incorporation theory, unless concrete appreciation forced the 
judge  to  decide  otherwise”.48 He  cites  a  decision  of  the  Netherlands  Supreme  Court49 as 
demonstrating an explicit and unconditional acceptance of the incorporation theory. Where a 
company has its central  administration in the Netherlands,  public policy considerations may 
mitigate the strict application of the theory of the place of incorporation.50 There are in fact a 
growing number of complaints that companies are incorporating as private companies in the UK, 
where there are no minimum capital  provisions for such entities,  and then conducting their 
business both  in  and from the  Netherlands.51 They are  there recognised  under the place of 
incorporation theory, and are thus able to avoid compliance with the minimum capital provisions 
44  (1728) 2 Ld. Raym. 1532, 92 E.R. 494
45  See Dicey and Morris The Conflict of Laws, at p.1107.
46  Dreyfus v CIR 1929 14 TC 560 at 576-7.
47  See  the  discussion  by  Stephan  Rammeloo  in  Current  Issues  of  Cross-Border  Establishment of  
Companies in the European Union. at pp. 52-55.
48  Ibid., at p.54.
49  Netherlands Supreme Court, 20 April 1990, RvdW, 1990, 84, NJ, 1991, 560.
50  See Rb. Amsterdam, 6 April 1982, WPNR 5765, p.817. The matter may also be affected by the 
application of the doctrine of “fraus legis”. However, in a later case before the Dutch Supreme Court, 11 
November 1988, NJ, 1989, 606, known as the Texelse Visser case, the court showed itself to be unwilling to 
subject  foreign  companies  to  the  provisions  of  Book II  of  the  Dutch  Civil  Code which  require  Dutch 
companies to register, on pain of the joint and several liability of their directors.
51  There are reputed to be some 6,000 of such companies according to Prof. L. Timmerman (University 
of Groeningen).
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applicable to Dutch private companies. There are currently new draft laws being considered in the 
Netherlands to deal with these problems .52
D. The French Approach
In the first half of the nineteenth century foreign companies were recognised in France and in 
Belgium without difficulty, following the real seat or other prevailing doctrines. However, in 
1849 the Belgian Cour de Cassation refused to recognise that a French société anonyme or public 
company had legal personality in Belgium53. The resulting furore led to a treaty in 1854 between 
the two countries and subsequent amendments to their laws providing for reciprocal recognition. 
However, the way in which the French law of 30th May 1857 was drafted led to an unforeseen 
consequence. This was that  as far as public companies were concerned, they could only be 
recognised in France if a general decree was enacted in France in favour of the sociétés anonymes 
of a particular country or if an international treaty was made between France and that country. 
Since that time many such general decrees have been promulgated and there are quite a number 
of treaties in existence, but there is still not a universal principle of recognition54. It seems that this 
rule  just  applies  to  public  companies,  and  that  other  types  of  company  (such  as  private 
companies) or associations will be governed by the previous siège réel basis for recognition. In 
all cases though, the recognition of a foreign company can be refused on public policy grounds, 
for example in respect of a drug-money laundering company or one formed to finance subversive 
political movements.
E. Treaties and Conventions
There are many treaties and conventions extant under which one nation agrees to recognise 
companies legally formed upon the other nation’s territory, either absolutely or upon certain 
conditions, such as there being nothing in the company’s constitution or objects which is contrary 
to the other nation’s public policy. There is a network of bilateral treaties linking many European 
and other states.  However the terms and the bases for recognition vary from convention to 
convention, and the network does not give complete coverage. There are also several multilateral 
conventions which have been proposed over the years, but none of them has ever been put into 
effect. 
The problems created by the cross border operation of companies could be minimised 
in a number of ways. If all states adopted the same criterion for a connecting factor linking 
companies to a particular jurisdiction, then it would not matter where a company was located, 
because it would be treated in the same way by all jurisdictions. Alternatively, if all states 
agreed to recognise companies created in any other state (regardless of that state’s adopted 
connecting factor) there would again be no discrimination. But many of these ideas and others 
like them have already been tried, either alone or as compromises between the two main 
approaches,  and  the  filing  cabinets  of  Europe  and  elsewhere  are full  of  conventions  and 
proposed  agreements which  have failed to  obtain recognition  or ratification  by  all  of  the 
parties.  See,  for  example,  the  proposals  of  the  League  of  Nations  in  192955,  the  Hague 
Convention of 1951 which was signed by several of the participating states at the  Hague 
Conference on Private International Law of 1956, the Institute of International Law rules of 
196556, the Council of Europe Convention on the Establishment of Companies 1966..
52  See section IV D below.
53  Pasicrisie 1849.1.221.
54  See B.Goldman and A.Lyon-Caen, Droit Commercial Europèen, 4th ed., (1993, Paris) at p.130.
55  See the sub-committee draft  of  the League of  Nations  for  an international  treaty on commercial 
companies.
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The latest in this line is the EC’s Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies, 
produced on the basis of article 220 of the Treaty of Rome, and signed on 29 February 1968. 
However, the Netherlands has consistently refused to ratify it, inhibited perhaps by the provisions 
of its law of 25 July 1959 referred to earlier. The Convention tried to effect a classic compromise 
between  the  place  of  incorporation and the  siège réel theories.  It  provided  that  companies 
established in accordance with the law of a member state and which have their registered office 
within the Community, must be recognised as of right in the other member states. However, the 
next two articles seem to have a different approach. The first is the rule permitting member states 
not to apply the convention to companies which have their real seat outside the Community, and 
which do not have an effective link with the economy of a member state. The second, and more 
fundamental, derogation from the place of incorporation approach permitted member states, by a 
unilateral declaration, to apply their own mandatory legal provisions to companies incorporated 
in another member state, but having their siège réel in the state of reception. Hence they could 
say, “we recognise you, but you will have to change your constitution”. This convention like all 
of those which have gone before, is currently gathering dust.
F. Conflicting Philosophies
None of these learned, scholarly and at  times very practical  solutions have ever come to 
fruition. Why is this? The most obvious reason is because the two conflicting philosophies in 
this field have never been fully reconciled.  One, the place of incorporation concept, originated 
from trading nations, keen to adopt a liberal open approach, with freedom to trade and to do 
business very much in mind. Equally the perceived need for certainty in commercial transactions 
is capable of having been another mainspring of this approach. Hence a system which told you 
immediately whether the corporation was valid at its place of birth, and therefore recognised in 
the relevant country had a great appeal. The other approach looked for a real connection between 
the corporation and the legal system upon which it depended for the establishment of its legal 
personality. Both concepts are agreed that the company must have been properly constituted 
according to the legal system to which it  is attached, but they differ over the nature of that 
attachment. The common law has taken what one can describe as the fiction theory approach to 
the nature of corporate personality, while many civil law systems have adopted a more realist 
approach to the question.
No satisfactory solution has been found to the overt conflict between the  siège réel 
states and the place of incorporation states, despite many ingenious efforts. However other 
issues may underlie  this  inability  to  reach an agreement  on the matter.  There is a  deeper 
diversity  between  the  laws of  the  various  states  involved.  Many  laws adopt  a  substance 
approach to  company law,  in  the sense that  they  are  more interested in  the  substance of 
transactions  than  in  the  form in  which  they  are  couched.  On  the  other  hand  there  are 
jurisdictions such as that of England  and Ireland which adopt a form-based approach i.e. if the 
company complies with the relevant formal requirements, then there is no need to insist that it 
also complies  with  the  substance  or spirit  of  the  law.  One classic example  may serve to 
illustrate this point. In the paradigm case in the UK enunciating the existence of a company’s 
separate corporate personality, Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd.57, Lord Macnaghten stated 
that, “There is nothing in the Act requiring that the subscribers to the memorandum should be 
independent or unconnected, or that they or any one of them should take a substantial interest 
in the undertaking, or that they should have a mind and will of their own”. This classic one 
man company, where the other shareholders were drawn from that  one man’s family,  was 
56  A commentary  on  these  rules  from  an  essentially  UK  perspective  is  provided  by  T.Drucker, 
“Companies in Private International Law”, (1968) 17 I.C.L.Q. 28
57  [1897] AC 22, House of Lords.
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recognised as perfectly valid under English law. One can compare this with the refusal to 
accept a ‘man of straw’ (literally an homme de paille) as a shareholder under Belgian and in 
theory  under  French  law.  Before  the  introduction  of  legislation  authorising  one  man 
companies, these jurisdictions required a substantial  participation by each of the founding 
shareholders for the company to be validly incorporated and beyond attack on the basis of 
nullity.
Another explanation may be that these treaties have never got to grips with the legitimate 
interests  of  the  various  states  in  the  matter,  and  always  meet  with  the  insistence  on  the 
maintenance of sovereignty as much as possible. States will just not give up their rights to refuse 
to recognise what they do not wish to recognise. In so far as this means that they are not willing to 
lose the right to protect themselves from the exploits of criminals trying to launder money, and 
financiers up to no good in carrying out shady deals through offshore companies, who can blame 
them. 
One thing though remains as a profound obstacle to further development in this area. 
The real seat states are most reluctant to depart from their system of recognition because they 
feel that it offers them the best protection against the depradations feared from the Delaware 
syndrome.  If some way is found of assuring them that there are other ways of providing the 
desired protection this might open doors that have been closed for many years.
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IV RESPONSES TO THE ‘DELAWARE SYNDROME’ IN REAL SEAT AND 
PLACE OF INCORPORATION JURISDICTIONS
A. The US Experience
The ‘Delaware Syndrome’ was spawned by the adoption in the United States of the place of 
incorporation rule for recognising and governing ‘foreign’ corporations, especially those from 
other states in the union.  The ability of the proprietors of a business to choose the jurisdiction 
that best suited their perceived needs has led to the emergence of one state as the most popular 
situs both for new incorporations and, especially, for reincorporations.  The first contender in 
this corporate law beauty competition was New Jersey but, after its regime was ‘tightened 
up’in 1913, it was overtaken by Delaware.58  David Charny states that the law of Delaware, 
“drafted under the auspices of the DuPont family to protect their managerial and shareholder 
interests - appeared relatively favourable to managers-shareholders of other corporations as 
well”59.  Delaware has seen to it that it has maintained its pre-eminence.  Bebchuk reports that, 
Delaware  is  at  present  the  domicile  of  more  than  half  of  all  Fortune  500 
companies and more than forty per cent. of all companies listed on the New York 
Stock  Exchange.   It  is  also  the  leading  destination  of  companies  that  re-
incorporate: Delaware attracted eighty-two per cent. of publicly traded firms that 
reincorporated in the past three decades and ninety per cent. of the New York 
Stock Exchange-listed Companies that reincorporated between 1927 and 1977.60 
The  phenomenon  of  the  development  of  a  market  for corporate  charters  in  listed 
companies has been extensively studied in the United States.  At least three major strands of 
opinion can be identified in the search for explanations of the Delaware Syndrome.  The first 
adopts the trenchant metaphor first put forward by Justice Brandeis, who described the system 
that led states to promote rules that attract corporations as the “race to the bottom”.61  This 
view, which is well argued in the seminal article by William Cary62, takes the line that states 
which  have  rules  which  are  particularly  lax  or  favourable  to  managers will  attract  most 
incorporations to the benefit of that state’s coffers and the local bar.  Cary’s article ends with 
the stirring words, “A civilising jurisprudence should import lifting standards; certainly there 
is no justification for permitting them to deteriorate.  The absurdity of this race to the bottom, 
with Delaware in the lead - tolerated and indeed fostered by corporate counsel - should arrest 
the conscience of the American bar when its current reputation is in low estate.”63  
Since Cary’s article was published other views have emerged.  One of these takes the 
line that market forces “will discourage managers from seeking incorporation in states with 
legal rules that permit managers to “exploit” shareholders. Incorporation in such states would 
increase the  company’s  vulnerability  to  takeovers (which  threaten  managers’ jobs), lower 
managers’ compensation and other employment-related benefits and harm managers’ present 
and future job prospects.”64  This view, which is adopted by Frank Easterbrook, Daniel Fischel, 
58  See  David  Charny,  “Competition  among Jurisdictions  in  formulating  Corporate  Law  Rules:  An 
American Perspective on the “Race to the Bottom” in the European Communities” (1992) 32 Harv. Int’l L.J. 
423 at. pp.427-8, citing  inter alia Henry N. Butler, “Ninteenth Century Jurisdictional Competition in the 
Granting of Corporate Privileges”,  14 J. Legal Stud. 129 (1985).
59  David Charny ibid.
60  Lucian A. Bebchuk, “Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law”, 105 Harv.L.R. 1437 (1992)
61  See the dissenting opinion of Brandeis J. in Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557-60 (1933)
62  William Cary, “Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware”, (1974) 83 Yale L.J. 663.
63  Ibid., at p. 705.
64  Bebchuk, op. cit., at p. 1445.
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Ralph Winter and others65 sees Delaware’s dominance as due to its adoption of rules which are 
most efficient from the shareholders’ point of view.  In their eyes the race for the bottom 
actually becomes a “race for the top”.  Both of these views look to the substantive content of a 
state’s  rules  as  it  major  attractant  feature.   However,  other states,  especially  Nevada and 
Wyoming,  have  not  lagged  far  behind  Delaware  in  producing  attractive  regimes66,  but 
nevertheless it retains its pre-eminence.  The work of Prof. Roberta Romano emphasises the 
formal advantages of the Delaware regime - comprehensive statutes and case law, experienced 
judiciary, wealth of precedents and the interest of a state that depends more heavily than its 
competitors on incorporation revenues (receipts from franchise taxes and fees and the income 
of local service providers, including lawyers) in maintaining the stability and serviceability of 
its regime.67  Bebchuk has characterised this as “the race for predictability and stability”,68 but 
says that it still does not address the question of whether state competition is desirable.  His 
learned analysis, “largely endorses federal intervention with respect to the corporate law areas 
currently  governed  by  federal  law,  including  insider  trading,  corporate  disclosure,  certain 
aspects of takeover bids and proxy contests and creditor protection in bankruptcy.” 69  He 
suggests that,  “the federal  role  should be expanded significantly  to  cover important  areas 
currently governed by state law.  In particular,  federal rules, or at  least, federal  minimum 
standards,  are  warranted  with  respect  to  self-dealing  transactions,  taking  of  corporate 
opportunities,  freezeout  mergers,  all  aspects  of  takeover  bids  and  proxy  contests,  and 
limitations on dividends.”70
B. A European Perspective
There is a growing body of literature examining the implications for Europe of the “race for 
the bottom” approach to corporate regulation.71  There is also some evidence that there have in 
the past been some attempts within Europe to take advantage of the Delaware syndrome to the 
extent  of  business proprietors seeking  a  benign  jurisdiction  in  which  to  incorporate  their 
enterprise.   In  the  latter  half  of  the  last  century  French  based  businesses  were wont  to 
incorporate in England using a ‘post-box’ office which merely redirected letters to the real 
centre of the business in Paris.72  In this century, in recent years French enterprises wishing to 
avoid some of the constraints of the law on  sociétés anonymes (S.A.) have sought to take 
advantage of the flexibility offered by the form of the Dutch naamlose vennotschap (N.V.).73 
Earlier in this article the propensity of Dutch businesses to incorporate in England to avoid 
65  Frank Easterbrook, “Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ Welfare: Theories and Evidence”, 9 Del. J. 
Corp. L. 540; Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, “Voting in Corporate Law”, (1983) 26 J.L. & Econ. 395; 
Daniel Fischel, “The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s 
corporation Law”, (1982) 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 913; Ralph Winter, “State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the 
Theory of the Corporation”, (1977) 6 J. Legal Stud. 251; Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, “The Market for 
Corporate Charters: “Unhealthy Competition” Versus Federal Regulation”, (1980) 53 J. Bus. 259.
66  See for example John Coffee, “The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New 
Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards”, (1987) 8 Cardozo L.Rev. 759.
67  See Roberta Romano, “The Political Economy of Takeover States”, (1987) 73 Va. L.Rev. 111; “The 
State Competition Debate in Corporate Law” (1987) 8 Cardozo L.Rev. 709; “Law as a Product: Some Pieces 
of the Incorporation Puzzle” (1985) 1 J.L.Econ. & Org. 225.
68  Bebchuk op. cit., at pp. 1446-7.
69  Ibid., at p. 1510.
70  Ibid.
71  See for example the excellent Chapter 9 in Brian Cheffins,  Company Law: Theory Structure and 
Operation, (Oxford 1997), pp. 421-451; David Charny op. cit.; Werner Ebke, “The Limited Partnership and 
Transnational Combinations of Business Forms: “Delaware Syndrome” Versus European Community Law”, 
(1988) 22 Int. Lawyer 191.
72  Batiffol and Lagarde op. cit., at p. 232.
73  Michel Germain, “La société par actions simplifiée”, (1994) La Semaine Juridique (JCP) Éd. G, no. 12 
p.153.
16
some of the more unwelcome features of the law of the place where their business would 
actually be carried on was noted.  Is there a real threat of a Delaware syndrome developing in 
Europe?
We have had in the heart of Europe an accommodating company and enterprise law 
regime in the shape of that of the Principality of Liechtenstein. This jurisdiction offers a very 
wide variety of legal  forms of enterprise, including that  of the domiciliary enterprise which 
merely has to have its registered office or seat in Liechtenstein - with or without an actual office - 
and does not exercise any business or commercial activity within the country74. Such an entity 
can enjoy several advantages not widely offered in other European jurisdictions, for example in 
relation to publicity on formation75, and inspection of the public register which does not, for 
example, provide information on the shareholders or accounts of the company76. Gibraltar too has 
an accommodating regime. Such jurisdictions could form the base for a European version of the 
Delaware syndrome, if other states in the region were inclined to give something like ‘full faith 
and credit’ to companies stemming from such a source.
C. The Real Seat Response
However, as has been said, it is this very threat that has motivated the conflicts systems of most 
civil law systems in Europe to adopt the real seat recognition test referred to above. A whole 
series of French decisions spanning the years between 1889 to 1957 has firmly maintained, in 
reponse to the ‘post-box’ companies referred to above, that a company cannot have a fictive seat, 
and that only one which corresponds to the actual location of the headquarters of the enterprise 
will be acceptable.77 The mere possibility of a corporation coming into their country from a more 
lax jurisdiction, and thereby enjoying legal advantages over domestic corporations, has proved 
anathema to these jurisdictions. As Inne Cath has stated, 78
"The system of ‘siège réel’ .... is generally defended on the ground that abuse of 
foreign  and  more  lenient  company  law should  be  prevented  or  that  certain 
mandatory  requirements  of  (domestic)  substantive  law  are  of  primordial 
importance (`règles d'application immédiate') for public policy considerations, or 
simply as a protectionist means to regulate entry of foreign companies."
This  view is  very  strongly  held  in  a  majority  of  European Union countries,  with  only  the 
Netherlands,  the  United  Kingdom,  Ireland  and  Denmark  taking  the  more  liberal  place  of 
incorporation line.  
We need to look at the interests of the various countries when the question of recognition 
and acceptance of a foreign corporation is in issue. The real seat countries are very wary of a 
corporation coming from abroad which has no real connection with its state of incorporation, 
being recognised as a legal entity in their country and possibly enjoying advantages of a lax or 
liberal  regime,  thus  putting  itself  at  a  competitive  advantage  compared  to  home  produced 
corporations. However, this hypothesis requires further analysis. While real seat states require a 
genuine connection between a corporation and the state from whose laws it derives validity, when 
it comes to the capacity or status of that corporation, and the rights that such a corporation is to 
enjoy, they generally take the line that such a foreign corporation cannot enjoy rights greater than 
those of domestic equivalent corporations. Hence the spectre of unfair competition is not a real 
74 Dr. P. Meinhardt Company Law in Europe 3rd ed. (Aldershot 1981) at entry FL.-Intr(ii).
75 ibid., at FL(AG) - 2(iii) where publicity for the formation of a domiciliary enterprise is not published in the 
official journals as ordinary public companies (AG) are, but is instead posted as a notice on the announcement 
board of the court (Personen- und Gesellschaftsrecht art. 955).
76 L.S. Sealy, P.G. Xuereb, R.R. Drury, C.R. Emmanuel, S.J. Gray, C. Murphy and D. Smith eds International 
Corporate Procedures, (Jordans, loose-leaf), entry for Leichtenstein IV A 1.
77  For further details of these cases see Batiffol and Lagarde op. cit., at p. 232.
78 Inne G.F. Cath, “Freedom of Establishment of Companies: a New Step Towards Completion of the Internal 
Market” (1986) 6 YEL 247, 250. 
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one in this respect. However, when it comes to liberal reporting and accounting arrangements or 
the rights of shareholders, the foreign corporation may be able to enjoy benefits not available to 
the  domestic  corporation.  Hence  there  is  a  considerable  and  genuine  fear  of  the  Delaware 
syndrome in Europe, 79 and this continues to underpin and reinforce a stringent adherence to the 
real seat doctrine as a first line of defence.
D. The Place of Incorporation Response
The  Delaware  syndrome  also  poses  problems  for  place  of  incorporation  countries,  whose 
apparently liberal recognition policies potentially leave them wide open to abuse. However these 
jurisdictions have shown that they are not powerless to defend themselves, and they have used a 
variety of techniques to protect vulnerable interest groups.  In the US, as we have seen earlier in 
this work, in the case of Western Airlines Inc. v. Sobieski, some state jurisdictions apply special 
conflicts rules when dealing with “tramp” or “pseudo-foreign” corporations. Other techniques 
involve the use of statutory rules or protection devices.  In an influential article80, Elvin Latty 
poses the question whether the law can be, “so simple and so blind”, as to allow the citizens of 
one  US state  to  avoid  uncongenial  features  of  local  corporation  law by  incorporating  in 
another state  which  does not  have  those features.  He argues  that  decisions  which  seem 
superficially to support the conclusion that pseudo-foreign corporations are beyond the reach 
of  local  law because  of  the  place  of  incorporation  rule,  are  in  fact  reconcilable  with an 
approach  that  distinguishes  between pseudo-foreign  corporations  and the  genuine  variety. 
Latty  reviews the  line  of  cases  that  have  applied  the  classic  place  of  incorporation  rule 
selection  doctrine  to  pseudo-foreign  corporations,  a  line  pre-eminently  represented  by 
Demarest v. Flack81, and argues that these decisions were in fact sound because no local policy 
was prejudiced by the recognition of such corporations as valid.  He finds that this whole line 
of cases which  have  applied  the law of the  place of incorporation does not  conclusively 
establish a determining rule because, in his words, “the courts looked first  to the state of 
incorporation and, finding no particular local policies substantial enough to overbalance the 
convenience of applying the foreign law, applied it.”82
Latty also examines a formidable number of cases which have applied local law to 
pseudo-foreign corporations.  Some comparatively early cases have challenged the ‘situs’ of a 
localised pseudo-foreign corporation, for example by allowing local garnishment of shares 
held by a defendant in such a corporation.  Another line of cases has disregarded the law of the 
place of incorporation on the grounds that it is contrary to local public policy, even though the 
policies  have  been  somewhat  outmoded  by  today’s  standards.   Examples  have  included 
restrictions on the ability to incorporate, seeking after limited liability unavailable locally and 
avoiding local safeguards for protecting creditors such as minimum capitalisation provisions. 
In a case which is relevant in a current European context, a Missouri court, mindful of a local 
statute requiring authorised capital to be fully subscribed and paid up to fifty per cent., found a 
group of Missouri residents, who had formed an undercapitalised Colorado corporation to run 
a  Missouri  business,  subject  to  unlimited  personal  liability.83  More  modern  protective 
legislation which has been litigated concerns the right  to inspect  corporate books without 
having to prove a ‘proper’ motive as required by the law of the place of incorporation. Latty 
suggests that states should stick to known and certain conflict rules, “until - but only until - 
79  See for example Werner Ebke, “The Limited Partnership and Transnational Combinations of Business 
Forms: “Delaware Syndrome” versus European Community Law”  22 The International Lawyer 191 (1988).
80  Elvin R. Latty, “Pseudo - Foreign Corporations” 65 Yale L.J. 137 (1955).
81  128 N.Y. 205, 28 N.E. 645 (1891).
82  Latty, op. cit., at p.150.
83  Cleaton v. Emery 49 Mo. App. 345 (K.C. Ct. App. 1892)
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there are strong policy reasons for doing otherwise”84.  When this occurs, the local law could 
be applied on a selective basis favouring, “those protective features of local law that indicate a 
fairly  strong  policy  of  safeguarding  the  particular  local  interests  in  question  (creditors, 
stockholders).”85
The desire to safeguard local interest groups has led individual states in the US to bring in 
a  statutory  protection  device.  It  must  be  remembered  that  recognition  under  the  place  of 
incorporation rules  does not  mean that  the corporation will  automatically  be allowed to  do 
business in the recognising state. Most states have a qualification statute which requires a foreign 
corporation to “qualify” before doing business in that state. Usually this qualification will involve 
a registration process and a formal appointment of an agent to receive service of process or writs. 
There are limits though, because it should also be remembered that the commerce clause of the 
US constitution prevents states from imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce and hence 
upon corporations engaged in it. William Carney has described the process in the following 
way86, 
Beginning  in  1852,  the  states  gradually  adopted  laws  that  resemble  modern 
statutes dealing with the qualification of foreign corporations  to  do business 
locally. Typically these laws required a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate 
of authority to transact business locally, which would issue on condition that the 
corporation  make  fundamental  disclosures  comparable  to  those  of  domestic 
corporations, appoint a local agent for service of process, and pay franchise fees. 
These statutes were not adopted grudgingly, but as a means of assuring that local 
citizens could obtain jurisdiction over such corporations, should disputes arise. 
In a significant group of US states the penalty for non-compliance with such laws requiring 
authorisation is that the corporation cannot enforce a contract in the state courts.87 In a smaller 
group of US states the non-complying corporation loses not only its rights to sue in the state 
courts, but also its rights under the contract.88
Latty’s analysis has shown that there are statutes in more that half of the US states which 
have  the effect  of approximating locally active foreign corporations  to  local  ones.89  These 
statutes may provide that foreign corporations which are admitted to do business locally are not 
to get better treatment than domestic corporations, or they may subject foreign corporations doing 
local business to all of the law, or just the corporation law, of the state.  In a few states in the US 
certain local regulations are expressly applied to pseudo-foreign corporations.  Following the 
Californian decision in  Western Airlines Inc. v. Sobieski  a statute was adopted applying certain 
sections  of  the  Californian  Corporation  Code  regulating  fundamental  corporate  changes  to 
pseudo-foreign corporations.  New York also takes a similar line with all foreign corporations not 
just pseudo-foreign ones. Latty notes that, “some of the local statutes that are expressly made 
applicable to foreign corporations in matters of what may be called internal affairs seem to be 
invoked in full force only against predominantly localized enterprises.”90
84  Latty op. cit., at p. 140.
85  Ibid., at p. 141.
86  William Carney in  Current Issues of Cross Border Establishment of Companies in the European 
Union, at p.256.
87  See E. Rabel The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study at pp. 203-4, where it is noted that the party 
dealing with the corporation is still bound to the contract, and the offending corporation may sue on the 
contract in the courts of other states and in the federal courts.
88  Ibid., at p.205.
89  Latty op. cit., at pp. 156-8.
90  Latty  op. cit., at p. 154. He cites as an example the case of  State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa Southern 
Utilities Co. of Delaware Iowa 784, 2 N.W. 2d 372 where a local Iowa statute that made certain provisions of 
Iowa corporations law applicable to foreign public utility corporations was applied to a Delaware corporation 
with utility properties solely in Iowa by a court which emphasised the essentially local character  of the 
corporation.
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However, despite the line taken in these states and in some isolated decisions like the 
ones referred to above, generally US states stick to a place of incorporation approach regarding 
the internal affairs of foreign corporations, and do not seek to protect the interests of their citizens 
by manipulating conflict of laws rules, preferring to rely on the ‘qualification to do business’ 
approach.
In the UK it has long been the case that, despite a very liberal attitude to recognition of 
foreign companies, certain safeguards have been put in place to protect those who do business 
with  them.   The  UK has  for  many  years  protected  its  citizens  by  requiring  all  ‘overseas 
companies’ which establish a place of business in Great Britain to register in the Companies 
Registry  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Companies  Acts  and  to  disclose  their 
accounts.91. This regime has now largely been subsumed into the new structure inaugurated by the 
Eleventh  Company  Law  Harmonisation  Directive92.  Under  this  EC  wide  regime  the  same 
information has to be provided, plus certain other particulars such as the extent of the authority of 
the directors to represent the company.93 This can be seen as an attempt to protect the citizens of 
the host state by giving them access to information on companies doing business in their domain.
As has been mentioned above,  Switzerland,  by passing its  Private International  Law 
Statute, which became effective from 1 January 1989, moved from being a jurisdiction which was 
characterised  by  its  preparedness  to  insist  on  determining  validity  by  the  siège  réel of  a 
company94, to one which looks primarily to the place of incorporation, and failing that to the 
place where the company is in fact administered, as a back-up test.95 However, although the place 
of  incorporation  theory  predominates,  Swiss  law  has  a  number  of  protective  devices.  For 
example, Art. 158 of the Private International Law Statute, in the Chapter dealing with foreign 
companies,  provides  that,  “A company  may  not  invoke  those  limitations  of  the  power  of 
representation of an officer or an agent that are unknown to the law of the country in which the 
other party has its business establishment or habitual residence unless the other party knew or 
should have known of the limitation.”96 The implications of this provision for the protection of 
Swiss citizens are obvious.  There is another provision which could have even more far reaching 
effects.  This is Art.159 which provides, “If the business of a company organised under foreign 
law is managed in Switzerland or from Switzerland, the liability of the persons acting on its 
behalf is governed by Swiss law.”97 The provision is not tightly drafted and much depends upon 
the way in which Swiss courts will construe it, but it is nevertheless a very rigorous way of 
protecting Swiss creditors against the misuse of a pseudo-foreign corporation.
In the Netherlands there have been problems with the total application of the place of 
incorporation theory where this is being used to evade certain matters of importance in the 
domestic  jurisdiction.   One  manifestation  of  these  problems  led  to  the  Segers  v. 
Bedrijfsvereniging Case98 in which the Dutch Social Security administration attempted to treat a 
company incorporated in England, which pursued its main activities in the Netherlands, in a 
91  See for example the provisions of ss. 406-414 Companies Act 1948, and later those of Part XXIII 
Companies Act 1985.  The registration process included the provision of copies of the constitution of the 
company, a list of directors and secretary and the names of one or more persons resident in Great Britain 
authorised to accept service of process and notices. Names used by overseas companies are regulated, and they 
are required to register copies of their balance sheet and profit and loss accounts.
92  87/666/EC implemented in the UK by the Oversea Companies and Credit and Financial Institutions 
(Branch Disclosure) Regulations 1992.
93  The provisions governing the registration of accounts are now slightly less rigorous than formerly, 
because accounts which under the law of the place of incorporation are required to be prepared, audited and 
disclosed are now acceptable in the UK.
94  See for example the decision of the Bundesgericht, 7 October 1982, BGE, 108, II, 318 et seq.
95  Swiss Private International Law Statute Art. 154.  See A.Samuel, “The New Swiss Private International 
Law Act”, 1988 I.C.L.Q. 681.




manner different from that in which it treated companies incorporated in the Netherlands.  The 
European  Court  held  that  this  type  of  discrimination  was  unjustified.   The  Netherlands,  a 
confirmed  place  of  incorporation jurisdiction,  has  developed  its  own style  of  protecting its 
populace from the depredations of such pseudo-foreign corporations in the form of Art.138 of 
Book Two of the Civil Code. This applies in the case of the involuntary winding up of a legal 
person incorporated under foreign law which is subject to corporation tax. It provides in Art. 
138.1 that in such a winding up each of its managing directors shall be jointly and severally liable 
for  liabilities  remaining  unpaid,  if  the  management  has  manifestly  performed  its  duties 
improperly  and where this  has  contributed to  the involuntary  winding  up.99 In  addition,  as 
Rammeloo explains, “regulations relevant to both company and labour law provisions governing 
annual accounts and audit reports ..... imposing a duty to keep accounts on all persons who carry 
on a business, also apply to foreign “entities”.100
However,  because  of  increasing  and  justified  fears  of  abuse,  there  are  two  Dutch 
proposals for legislation which go even further. The first is contained in the 1992 draft of an 
Outline of a Consolidated Conflict of Laws Act, Art. 76 of which contains a “set of mandatory 
rules imposing duties on the company, to be fulfilled by its managers and (para. 8) others who are 
in charge of the management activities conducted in the Netherlands.”101 There is also a further 
Advisory Draft of an Act governing abuse of foreign company forms which proposes to apply 
several provisions of Dutch law to pseudo-foreign companies, which are defined as being linked 
to a foreign legal system purely because of their incorporation.102
Altogether  these  examples  from place  of  incorporation  jurisdictions  display  what  a 
formidable array of armaments can be deployed in order to combat the Delaware syndrome. In 
very many respects they achieve the same objectives as those which lie behind adherence to the 
siège réel approach to recognition, in that they ensure the protection of the citizens of the state 
where the foreign company is trading against attempts by businessmen to shelter behind more 
favourable provisions of a foreign legal system. However, retention of the place of incorporation 
basis  for  recognition  does  mean  that  these  jurisdictions  appear  more  welcoming to  inward 
investment flows and other business generated by companies that genuinely stem from other 
jurisdictions.
V CONCLUSION
One gets the feeling that there must have been a certain amount of friction over the years 
between the proponents of the different views on a suitable connecting factor for corporations 
in  a  conflict  of  laws  situation.  International  conferences  and  institutions  have  sought 
compromise  solutions  to  bring  about  a  situation  facilitating  recognition  among  the 
participating states. Many, if not most, of these have decided on a route which has adopted a 
base rule looking to the place of incorporation as the deciding factor, but provided derogations 
in favour of real seat factors where these were felt necessary to protect relevant interests. In 
reality both views have much to offer, but both proceed from deeply held convictions. The 
place of incorporation approach offers certainty and comparative simplicity, while the real seat 
98  Case  79/85  Segers  v  Bedrijfsvereging  voor  Bank-en Vezekeringswezen,  Groothandel en  Vrije 
Beroepen [1986] ECR 2375.
99  S.Rammeloo in Current Issues of Cross Border Establishment of Companies in the European Union 
at p.. 56.
100  Ibid. at p. 59.
101  Ibid. at p. 56. These rules include registration, certification of compliance with Dutch minimum capital 
rules and submission of annual accounts and audit rules. These latter provisions though do not apply to 
companies governed by the law of an EU state.
102  Ibid. at pp. 60-1. These rules will relate in a similar fashion to registration, publicity, minimum capital 
and disclosure of accounts.
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line offers greater protection from abuse and a conceptually more satisfying link between an 
artificial entity and its contemporaneous legal matrix. It may well be the case that many of the 
thoughtfully devised solutions referred to above have failed to gain acceptance because real 
seat states have felt that the protection offered by the compromise solutions (usually non-
recognition of corporations whose main activities were not in their place of incorporation) did 
not go far enough. Local interests were not felt to be adequately protected.
This article has attempted to outline the approaches taken by place of incorporation 
and  real  seat  jurisdictions  to  the  questions  of  regulation  and  recognition  of  foreign 
corporations.  It  has  then  indicated  some  of  the  ways  in  which  such  jurisdictions  have 
responded to the threat posed by a corporation incorporated in one jurisdiction, which carries 
out its business in another jurisdiction which perhaps has more stringent rules governing its 
domestic corporations. While real seat jurisdictions have relied essentially on that doctrine of 
recognition to protect themselves, place of incorporation jurisdictions have had to devise other 
rules to achieve the same ends. If these rules can be seen to fulfil the same function as that 
carried out by the real seat recognition doctrine, real seat states may be able to make their own 
evaluation of such rules, and find that they give a viable alternative approach to protection. 
Such a realisation could lead to a more positive reappraisal of proposals for a Convention on 
the Mutual Recognition of Companies with its corresponding benefits for world trade.
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